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Abstract 
This paper is concerned with the classic topic of intertemporal resource economics: 
the optimal harvesting of renewable natural resources over time by one and several 
resource owners with conflicting interests. The traditional management model, dating 
back to Plourde (1970), is extended towards a two–state model in which harvesting 
equipment is treated as a stock variable. As a consequence of this extension, 
equilibrium dynamics with bifurcations and limit cycles occur. We also discuss 
conflicts as a game with two types of players involved: the traditional fishermen 
armed with the basic equipment and the heavy equipment users. Both players have a 
common depletion function, considered as harvesting, which is dependent together on 
personal effort and on intensity of equipment’s usage.  
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1. Introduction 
Intertemporal economic problems can be formulated either as optimal 
management models or as dynamic games.  A basic difference between the two types 
of formulation is that, in the former case there is only one strategically acting agent, 
i.e. the regulator, while in the latter there are more than one strategically interacting 
agents, choosing their actions that determine the current and future levels of utility. 
Consider, for example, a single stock of an exhaustible or reproductive resource that 
is simultaneously exploited by several agents that do not cooperate.  
Each agent chooses an extraction strategy to maximize the discounted stream 
of future utility. Then, the actions taken determine not only their utility levels but also 
the level of the stock. There are several implications of the above formulation. First, 
the actions taken by agents determine the size of a single capital stock that fully 
describes the current state of the economic system. Second, if there is no mechanism 
that forces players to coordinate their actions, they will act strategically and play a 
non–cooperative game. Third, the equilibrium outcome will critically depend on the 
strategy spaces available to the agents.  
There is a wide choice of possible actions (strategies) taken by the players. 
They may choose a simple time profile of actions and pre-commit themselves to these 
fixed actions over the entire planning horizon. Players then use open–loop strategies. 
Alternatively players might choose feedback or closed–loop or Markov strategies 
conditioning their actions on the current state of the system and reacting immediately 
every time the state variable changes, hence they are not required to pre-commit. If 
fisheries use open–loop strategies they specify a time path of fishing effort in the 
beginning of the game and commit themselves to stick to these preannounced actions 
over the entire planning horizon.  
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Alternatively, if they use feedback strategies they choose decision rules that 
determine current actions as a function of current stock of the resource. Feedback 
decision rules capture the strategic interactions present in a dynamic game. If a rival 
fishery makes a catch today that necessarily results in a lower level of the fish stock, 
the opponents react with actions that take this change in the stock into account. In that 
sense closed–loop strategies capture all the features of strategic interactions. 
In these lines, the main contribution of the paper relies on the results obtained 
firstly, in the optimal management of the two state variable model in which the 
harvesting is treated as a function of accumulated equipment and secondly, in the 
Nash equilibrium of the game for which the players compete having a common 
harvesting (depletion) function. In equilibrium terms we find first, the conditions 
under which equilibrium with limit cycles occur in the management problem and 
second, we find the relation between the player’s discount factors in order to ensure 
equilibrium with limit cycles, as well.  
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 reviews the existing 
related literature and comments about the importance of the cyclical strategies in 
harvesting management. Section 3 discusses the two dimensional optimal control, as 
the one state model is well known. The next section concerns the conflicts as dynamic 
game with two players and with a common harvesting function. The last section 
concludes the paper. 
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2. Literature review 
In environmental economics’ vast literature, one given important meaning is 
connected with the exploitation of natural resources. According to this literature 
strand a regeneration function is involved, which is necessary to model the 
interactions between the nature and the human activities. In an important paper, 
Strobele (1988) considers the whole environment as renewable natural resource and 
the damage done to nature is described by a downward shift in the regeneration 
function due to the industrial waste emission. In the same, but more restrictive, way 
Hannesson (1983) compares the optimality of the monopolistic and social planning 
extractions, finding that the monopolistic standing optimal stock of the resource (say 
the nature) may either be larger or smaller than under the social planning. 
 Strobele and Wacker (1995) extend the one specie exploitation to multiple 
species in a predator–prey model. They derive a modified golden rule of harvesting, 
applying optimal control theory. Their conclusions about the modified golden rule in 
the steady state, is related with the “additional productivity effects”. Farmer (2000), 
reconsidering Mourmouras’ type overlapping generations’ model with renewable 
natural resources, shows that there exists a non trivial stationary state which exhibits, 
by definition, intergenerational natural – capital equality. 
Finally, natural resources harvesting differs from production. Renewable 
resources economic literature, based on the foundations of Gordon (1954), Scott 
(1955) and Smith (1969), suggests particular properties of the open access natural 
resources which requires tools of analysis beyond those supplied by elementary 
economic theory. Such an appropriate tool is the optimal control theory and the use of 
differential equations in dynamic systems (either in a continuous or a discrete 
framework), which are of common use in most models that explain the optimal 
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management of natural resources extraction. These systems depend on more than one 
parameter that measures different economic and biological characteristics of the 
exploited resource. So the structural stability is a key point to study in order to explore 
whether the qualitative dynamical properties of the system persist when its structure is 
perturbed. In this context, the study of the structural stability is the first step to follow 
the analysis of the system.  
On the other hand, it is reasonable to consider the stock of any renewable 
resource as a capital stock and treat the exploitation of that resource in much the same 
way as one would treat accumulation of a capital stock. This has been done to some 
extent by Clark (1990) and Clark and Munro (1975), whose papers contain a 
discussion of this point of view. However, the analysis is much simpler than it appears 
in the literature especially since the interaction between markets and the natural 
biology dynamics has not been made clear. Furthermore renewable resources are 
commonly analyzed in the context of models where the growth of the renewable 
resource examined is affected by two factors: the size of the resource itself and the 
harvesting rate. This specification does not take into account that human activities 
other than harvesting may have an impact on the growth of the natural resource 
(Levhari and Withagen, 1992).  
Some externalities may arise in maximum sustained yield programs of 
replenishable natural resource exploitation followed by two fundamental problems. 
The first is that the existence of a social discount factor (or interest rate) may cause 
the maximum sustained yield program to be non-optimal (Plourde, 1970). The second 
problem relates to many externalities which may be present in harvesting resources. 
The most significant of these externalities is the stock externality in production. That 
is, there is a potential misallocation of inputs in the production of natural resource 
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product due to the fact that one input, the natural resource, contributes to production 
but may not receive payment, as nobody owns the resource. 
An analysis of the biomass harvesting (like fisheries) must take into account 
the biological nature of fundamental capital, the renewable resource, and must 
recognize the common property feature of land or sea, so it must allow that the 
fundamental capital is the subject of exploitation. The problem of fishing industry has 
been tackled by economists giving attention to the common property characteristics 
associated with both the open access and the lack of proper property rights to the 
fishery industry (Gordon, 1954; Björndal, 1987). A number of existing studies on 
fishery economics have paid attention to the form of properties: full rights or no rights 
at all (Smith, 1969; Plourde, 1971). Both cases lead to unique Nash non-cooperative 
outcomes with the social planner’s outcome in the case of full rights and the open 
access in the case of no rights. The latter is the result of the tragedy of commons (for 
discussion see Clark and Munro, 1975). 
The fishery model with adjustment costs, arisen from changes in control 
variable, has been solved by Liski et al. (2001), thus providing a link between stable 
limit cycle policies and increasing returns in harvesting. 
The management model, presented here, is close to a Wirl’s (1995) paper 
which analyses the stability of optimal renewable resource extraction programs. In the 
complementary Wirl’s paper the second state variable is the capital, while the 
harvesting function thought as a function of effort, capital and resource stock. 
Choosing the cost parameter as a bifurcation variable he shows that the cyclical 
exploitation of renewable resources may be optimal. The crucial condition that drives 
this result is the possibility of growth of the biomass, which implies that the stock 
falls below the level that maximizes the sustainable yield. 
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2.1 Cyclical strategies in harvesting management 
In the fishery economics management vast literature two possible optimal 
strategies are considered under stationary conditions (e.g. Plourde, 1971; Clark,  
1990). The first ones are the continuous time strategies, whereby the renewable 
resource is exploited at all times. Following this type of strategy, the resource stock is 
considered dependent on both economic and social conditions as regards the resource, 
the discount rate and finally the initial resource stock size. The implications of that 
strategy depend on the stationary size of the resource, for which the harvesting rate is 
decided (Lewis and Schmalensee, 1979). As it becomes clear -and as it is well known- 
the above strategy does not take into account (or neglects) the role of capital inflows 
taking place in the harvesting industry.  
As already mentioned, one can consider as capital inflows the available fleets 
and the human capital employed, but a more interesting aspect is the ability to modify 
all the above capital factors involved in the harvesting. Another important reason to 
deviate from the original continuous time strategy is the argument raised by some 
authors (e.g. Clark, 1990; Dawind and Kopel, 1997), which states that harvesting 
strategies that stabilize the stock of the renewable resource to a usual steady state 
level may be replaced by policies involving the abandonment or cyclical utilization of 
the resource (Liski et al., 2001). 
This second strategy, already discussed in harvesting management literature, 
involves extinction or abandonment policies, implying that, after a finite time, 
harvesting is abandoned forever (Lewis and Schmalensee, 1979).  A first valuable 
insight for this type of optimal strategy is the fact that cyclical fishing policies are 
observed in practice. Moreover, Björndal (1987) uses data covering years 1952–1972 
to show a relatively regular cyclical pattern for harvesting. In harvesting management, 
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one possible optimal cyclical harvest policy, well known as chattering strategies or 
pulse fishing (Liski et al., 2001), is incorporated with the fleets’ withdrawal and 
reentry as well as by hiring and firing workers, thus implying cost fluctuations.  
Chattering strategies, in fishery management, are also subject to adjustment 
costs since the harvest rate and the costs incurred (startup and reentry costs) are 
independent of each other. The size of adjustment costs plays a crucial role in the 
optimal harvesting policies. Especially in the case of relatively modest adjustment 
costs, it has been shown that all conceivable policies will exhibit a limit cycle policy 
over time, which not only exists but it is also stable. One important result obtained 
from the above chattering policy is the fact that the cyclical utilization of the resource 
is related to smooth fluctuations and not to complete shutdowns of the fishery 
management.  The economic implication of the cyclical harvesting policy existence is 
summarized as the profitable advantage of increasing returns by temporarily 
harvesting excessive quantities and stabilizing the stock of fish over time by cutting 
the harvest rate back after each period of excessive harvesting (Liski et al., 2001).  
It is also worth noting that the above given implication is valid only for low 
adjustment costs; otherwise, for high adjustment costs, it is preferable to follow the 
saddle point stability with a constant harvest rate. The importance of cyclical policies 
in harvesting, also known as pulse fishing policies, is confirmed by Wirl’s model 
(Wirl, 1995), whereby the resulting cyclical strategy is related to the positive 
externality of the stock. Moreover, in the same paper, Wirl obtains saddle point 
stability for low adjustment costs contrary to the results obtained by Liski et al 
(2001). 
While the importance of pulse fishing policies is well understood in the 
management context, the possibility of limit cycle policies in the conflicting approach 
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has not been previously addressed, at least to our knowledge. Therefore, in order to 
achieve realism, we suggest a simple game model between two types of players: the 
crowd of the negligible capital investment fishermen, using a single boat for their 
fishing effort, and the heavily equipped players, using a fleet of vessels, hence facing 
adjustment costs. As it becomes clear, the crowd of the first type, thought as one 
player, has all the prerequisites (i.e. negligible adjustment costs and increasing 
returns) to follow the profitable cyclical patterns as identified in the management 
case, but it is not certain that their costs remain negligible due to the presence of the 
heavily equipped rivals in the same harvesting arena.  Supposing that they adhere to 
the cyclical fishing policy, as the proven profitable solution for them, they take the 
corresponding substantial risk.  
On the other side, the heavily equipped players, using fleets and workingmen 
and therefore facing adjustment costs, decide to follow the same profitable cyclical 
pattern, lowering their adjustment costs as much as possible. Since the low adjustment 
cost is the basic prerequisite to follow a cyclical pattern it is reasonable to internalize 
the above cost inside the intensity of their fleet usage. In the suggested conflict 
between the two types of players, the basic supposition is that the players adhere to 
the cyclical patterns, as they are considered the only profitable policies that stabilize 
the resource stock. In this way, the suggested model contributes to the existing 
harvesting management literature in the conflicting sense, clarifying the conditions 
under which the desired cyclical policies are obtained. 
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3. A management of commercial harvesting 
In the traditional case model, also studied for instance by Clark and which 
goes back to the very simple Gordon-Schaefer model, ( )x t  is the resource stock at 
time t , ( )tφ  the resource’s harvesting function and ( )( )g x t  the regeneration function 
of the natural resource. With these functions in the model one obtain the system 
dynamics, as          ( ) ( )( ) ( )x t g x t tφ= −ɺ                      ( )1  
It is assumed that the regeneration function [ ): 0,g ∞ → ℝ  is continuous, 
twice continuously differentiable on ( )0,∞  and strictly concave. In addition, it is 
assumed that ( ) ( )
0
0 0,    lim
x
g g x
→
′= =∞ , and that there exists a unique resource stock 
0x >  such that ( ) 0g x = . This implies that ( ) 0g x′ >  for all ( )0,x x∈  and 
( ) 0g x′ <  for all x x> .  
The goal of the decision maker is to maximize the discounted utility derived 
over the infinite planning interval [ )0,∞ . That is, the objective functional is given as: 
  ( )( )
0
te U t dtρ φ
∞
−∫                    ( )2  
where [ ): 0,U ∞ → ℝ  is the utility function. Concerning equilibrium, in this reference 
one state model, it has been shown that the optimal management admits a unique 
equilibrium path which converges to the saddle point (see for example Dockner et al, 
2000). 
One the other hand, commercial extraction of natural resources in an intensive 
rate requires sometimes improvements on the harvesting equipment in order to be 
efficient. But better equipment is subject to adjustment costs, for instance electronic 
machines, vessels, boats and workmen hiring are some of these adjustment costs. The 
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supposition of quadratic adjustment costs simplifies the arithmetic calculations but is 
not essential. With these additional assumptions one can treat the harvesting effort not 
as an instantaneous control but rather as a stock variable. Integrating over past 
adjustments the new control variable ( )E t  enters into the model, describing the 
evolution of the harvesting effort.  
3.1. Adjustment costs 
Considering harvesting as a stock variable, some modifications are necessary 
to made in the objective functional, that is the introduction of the adjustment costs 
( )( )C E t , for the new stock. In this subsection, as the analysis it is well known e.g. 
Liski et al. (2001), we briefly discuss a concave natural resources regeneration 
function ( )g x . The concavity of the function ( )g x  states that the law of diminishing 
returns applies here too.  Moreover the utility enjoyed by the representative agent is a 
function depending on the harvest ( )tφ  and on the existing resource stock, as well. 
With these modifications the optimal management problem becomes 
              
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
0
max ,t
E t
e U t x t C E t dtρ φ
∞
−  −  ∫                      ( )3  
subject to         
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
0
, 0
, 0
x t g x t t x x
t E t
φ
φ φ φ
= − =
= =
ɺ
ɺ
4
5
   
Model ( ) ( )−3 5  is an optimal control with two state and one control variable and with 
a quadratic cost function. The necessary conditions required by the maximum 
principle, provide the following four dimensional system of equations: 
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( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )1 1 2 2
,
,
x t g x t t t E t
H H
x
φ φ
λ ρλ λ ρλ
φ
= − =
∂ ∂
=− + =− +
∂ ∂
ɺɺ
ɺ ɺ
6 7
8 9
    
together with the optimality                    1 0
H
C
E
λ
∂ ′=− + =
∂
                   ( )10 .  
The function   ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 2,H U t x t C E t g x t t E tφ λ φ λ = − + − +     
is the Hamiltonian current value of the problem ( ) ( )−3 5  and 1 2,   λ λ  are the costate 
variables.  
According to Hartman (1963), the behavior of the trajectories of system 
( ) ( )−6 9  around certain equilibrium points can be deduced from the qualitative study 
of the linear system y Jy=ɺ , where J  is the Jacobian matrix given by the partial 
derivatives of the functions of the right hand side of system ( ) ( )−6 9  with respect to 
each variable.  The possibility of limit cycles appearance in models with two state 
variables was established by Dockner and Feichtinger (1991).  
Now, one can use an explicit quadratic formula for the adjustment cost 
function that helps the qualitative analysis of the system ( ) ( )−6 9 . Using the quadratic 
cost function ( ) 21 2C E Eγ= with 0γ> , then expression ( )10  becomes 1E λ γ=  
and finally the conditions that determine the optimal plan of a central decision maker, 
after the appropriate substitutions, are (time is neglected to avoid notational 
overburdening): 
                                 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
0
1 0
1 1
2 2 1
, 0
, 0
x
x g x x x
g U
Uφ
φ
φ λ γ φ φ
λ ρ λ
λ ρλ λ
= − =
= =
′= − −
= − +
ɺ
ɺ
ɺ
ɺ
11
12
13
14
 
 13 
The study of the dynamic properties of system ( ) ( )−11 14 includes stability of 
the system which is restricted to saddle point stability, i.e. to a two dimensional 
manifold in the four dimensional space of state and costates. According to Dockner’s 
explicit formula (Dockner, 1985) the four eigenvalues ,   1,..., 4ir i= of the linearized 
dynamics of the canonical equations are given by: 
                    ( )2 21,2,3,4 2 4 2 1 2 4detr Jρ ρ= ± −Ψ ± Ψ −        ( )16  
and the magnitude Ψ  is the sum of determinants of submatrices of the Jacobian J  
expressed as: 
                   
1 22
1 1 1 12 2
1 22
2
x x x x
x
x
φ φ
λ φ λφ λ
λ λ λ λλ λ
λ φ λφ λ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂
Ψ = + +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂
ɺ ɺɺ ɺ ɺ ɺ
ɺ ɺ ɺ ɺɺ ɺ
       ( )17  
 
From Dockner’s formula ( )16 , it is well known that sufficient conditions for 
the saddle point are first the positive determinant of the Jacobian matrix and secondly 
the negativity of the coefficient Ψ  given by( )17 . A positive determinant of the 
Jacobian is crucial for stability, because a negative determinant restricts the stability 
to a one dimensional manifold of initial conditions (with one negative eigenvalue, the 
other three are positive or have positive real parts) and the generic solution is 
unstable. Figure 1 classifies the eigenvalues depending on the determinant of J 
( det J ) and Ψ .  
 
 
 
 
 14 
                                              det J 
                                                        ( )
( )
( )
1,2
3,4
2 2
,
Re 0
Re 0
det 2 2
ir i
r
r
J ρ
∈ ∀
>
=
= Ψ + Ψ
ℂ
 
                                                                                        ( )2det 2J = Ψ  
                                                                      
( )
,
Re 0
i
i
r i
r
∈ ∀
>
ℂ  
          
1,2 3,4
,
0, 0
ir i
r r
∈ ∀
> <
ℝ                    
( )
( )
1,2
3,4
,
Re 0
Re 0
ir i
r
r
∈ ∀
>
<
ℂ
 
                                                                                     
( )
,
Re 0
, , 0
i
i
i i
r i
r or
r i r
∈ ∀
>
∈ ∀ >
ℂ
ℝ
 
                                                                                                                          Ψ  
                       
( )
1,2,4 3
1 3 2,4
0, 0
0, 0, Re 0
r r or
r r r
> <
> < >
            
( )
1,2,4 3
1 3 2,4
0, 0
0, 0, Re 0
r r or
r r r
> <
> < >
 
 
 
Figure 1: Classification of the eigenvalues depending on det J  and Ψ .  
 
As one can see in Figure 1, also published by Dockner and Feichtinger (1991), 
there not exists at least one case for which all eigenvalues are negative numbers, the 
latter means that complete stability is impossible. Dockner and Feichtinger (1991) 
show that a necessary and sufficient condition for the eigenvalues to be pure 
imaginary numbers is ( )212det J > Ψ and ( )
2 21 1
2 2
det J ρ= Ψ + Ψ . Moreover, the 
necessary and sufficient conditions correspond to the eigenvalues 3,4r  that cross the 
imaginary axis when they go from one side of the dashed curve to the other. 
Considering the discount rate ρ  as a parameter, the values of ρ  for which the 
conditions are met, are possible Hopf bifurcations
[1]
 (Kuznetsov, 1997) and a limit 
                                                 
[1]
 Hopf bifurcations occur when there are two pure imaginary eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix. Hopf 
bifurcations, so called bifurcations of co–dimension one, are related to the existence of a simple real 
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cycle will emerge if the complex eigenvalues 3,4r  cross the imaginary axis with non-
zero velocity at   0ρ ρ= , i.e. ( )( )
0
3,4
d
Re 0
d
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ =
≠  
Following formula ( )16  one can compute the Jacobian J  of equations 
( ) ( )−11 14  at the equilibrium: 
               
1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0
1
xx x
x
g
J
U g U U g
U U
φ φ
φ φφ
γ
ρ
ρ
 ′ − 
 
 =  ′′ ′− − − − 
 − −  
                       ( )18  
and the determinant of J  is: 
       
( ) ( )2
det      
x xxg U g g U U g U
J
φ φφ φρ ρ
γ
′ ′ ′ ′′− + − − −
=          ( )19  
Considering stability, the one dimensional control problem without adjustment 
costs, studied by Berck (1981), served as a good benchmark for comparisons with the 
two state variables model. The Hamiltonian current value of the one dimensional 
problem is: ( ) ( )( )1 ,H U x g xφ λ φ= + −  and the optimality conditions are given as: 
                          0H Uφ φ λ= − =                                           ( )20  
                       ( ) xg Uλ ρ λ′= − −ɺ                                         ( )21  
                          ( )x g x φ= −ɺ                                                 ( )22  
Setting the optimal control ( ),xφ χ λ= , the derivatives with respect to ,   x λ  are 
x x xU Uφ φφφ χ= =−  and 1Uλ λ φφφ χ= = . The Jacobian matrix Jˆ  of the one 
dimensional model without adjustment costs, after these calculations, becomes 
                                                                                                                                            
eigenvalue of Jacobian matrix equal to zero. The dynamic change produced by values of the parameter 
higher than the bifurcation value has the result of closed trajectories (limit cycles). The equilibrium 
point for which there exist any of these two types of eigenvalues is known as non hyperbolic 
equilibrium point. 
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      ( )2
1
ˆ x
xx x x
x x
g U U Ux
J
U g U U U g U U
x
φ φφ φφ
φ φ φφ φ φφ
λ
ρλ λ
λ
 ∂ ∂
   ′ + − ∂ ∂  = =   ′′ ′− − + − − ∂ ∂    
 ∂ ∂ 
ɺ ɺ
ɺ ɺ
 
Calculating the determinant of the Jacobian Jˆ  one can see that it finally becomes  
                
( ) ( )2ˆdet      x xxg U g g U g UJ
U
φ φφ
φφ
ρ ρ′ ′ ′ ′′− + − −
=            ( )23  
Comparing ( )19  and ( )23  it can be seen that the relation between these determinants 
is     
ˆdet    
det      
J U
J
φφ
γ
=                  ( )24   
Some simple conclusions from the above discussion are drawn below: 
- First, relation( )24 , between Jacobian determinants, implies that any instability 
arisen from the one dimensional problem cannot stabilize the two dimensional 
problem even with the introduction of adjustment costs and second stock 
variable into the model.  
- Second, looking at ( )17  we realize that the three terms summed up are 
essential. The first and second terms are the determinants of the one 
dimensional problem without adjustment costs, while the third term measures 
the interaction between the first two terms.  
Application of ( )17  yields                ( )g g Uφφρ γ′ ′Ψ = − +                  ( )25  
Hence, in the case of growth 0g ′ > , the suppositions of the logistic growth 
( 2g ′′ =− ), 0xU Uφφ φ= =  and 0g ρ′ > >  are sufficient to ensure saddle point 
stability,( )det   0,   0J > Ψ< , but the local monotonicity is not implied. 
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3.2. The incentive for fleet modifications  
As a continuation of the previous discussion about commercial harvesting, the 
basic two dimensional management problem consisting of equations( ) ( )−3 5 , can also 
be modified in the case the available equipment is subject to expansions or reductions. 
As already mentioned, harvesting equipment can be considered the available fleet, 
electronic machines, boats, nets, workmen hiring and so forth. Equipment’s 
modifications are also highly dependent on the existing renewable resource stock and 
it can be seen as a stock as well, which affects directly the harvesting function φ .  
Therefore one can treat the harvesting function ( )tφ  as a function of the 
accumulated equipment, ( )Eφ . The accumulated equipment E , does not, however, 
remain at a fixed level, but is also subject to depreciation, which entails at a simple 
depreciation rate and moreover it is reasonable to argue that the renewable resource 
extractor enjoys utility from the decision to modify equipment. The modifications that 
are possible to the original model are first, in the objective functional which enters in 
an additively separable utility form and, second in the two equations of motion. 
Setting harvesting equipment as a state variable, the decision to expand (or to reduce) 
would be now the new control which enters into the system.  
After all the simplified assumptions, the original optimal control problem 
( ) ( )7 9−  now becomes 
                                    ( ) ( )1 2
0
max   t
u
e U x U u dtρ
∞
−  + ∫                      ( )26  
                    
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0
0
subject to         , 0
and      , 0
x t g x t E x x
E t u E E E
φ
δ
= − =
= − =
ɺ
ɺ
27
28
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( ) ( )1 2,   U x U u  represent utility in separable form, consisting of the utility derived 
from the existing renewable resource stock and from agent’s decision u  to modify his 
equipment. The harvesting function ( )Eφ  is denoted as a function of the available 
equipment, while δ  is the equipment’s depreciation rate. The control u  influences 
directly equipment’s changes, but also has an indirect effect on the renewable 
resource stock via the harvesting ( )Eφ .  
Moreover the representative agent faces an intertemporal trade–off between 
the benefits associated with the stock ( )1U x  and the benefits resulting from fleet’s 
expansion or reduction ( )2U u . It is worth noting that the second part of utility ( )2U u  
is the net value, which captures all the costs associated with the expansion or 
reduction. Finally, the decision to modify equipment, u , is maybe positive in the case 
of expansion or negative in the case of reduction, which also means that the 
depreciation parameter δ  can be set to zero at the steady state equilibrium implying 
0u∞ = , i.e. no equipment’s modification made in equilibrium.  
We proceed by analyzing the continuous–time optimization problem for which 
the extractor of the renewable resource seeks to maximize the discounted stream of 
benefits expressed by ( )26 .  The Hamiltonian is:      
( ) ( )1 2 1 2H U x U u x Eλ λ= + + + ɺɺ ,  
where 1 2,   λ λ  are the adjoint variables of the states ,   x E  respectively. The 
Hamiltonian is concave in both states and control because the utility functions are 
both concave as well as the equations of motion for the states ,   x Eɺɺ . The concavity 
implies that the sufficient optimality conditions are met if additionally the limiting 
transversality conditions are satisfied 
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1
2
lim  0
lim  0
t
t
t
t
e x
e E
ρ
ρ
λ
λ
−
→∞
−
→∞
=
=
 
The Hamiltonian maximizing condition for control values lying in the interior is given 
by                                    ( )*2 2 0uH U u λ′= + =                        ( )29  
and moreover the Hamiltonian’s strict concavity implies              ( )1 0uuH U u′′= <  
Applying the inverse function theorem the inverse function ( ) ( ) ( )12 2 2h Uλ λ
−′=  
already exists, satisfying the optimality condition                ( )( )2 1 2, , , , 0uH x E h λ λ λ =  
The following two equations determine the evolution of the costates 1 2,  λ λ  
                                   ( )( ) ( )1 1 1g x U xλ ρ λ′ ′= − −ɺ                      ( )30  
                                    ( ) ( )2 2 1 Eλ ρ δ λ λφ′= + +ɺ                        ( )31  
Equations ( )30 , ( )31  together with the two equations of motion ( )27 , ( )28  
constitutes the following canonical system of necessary conditions 
   ( ) ( )( ) ( )x t g x t Eφ= −ɺ              ( )32
  
   ( ) ( )2E t h Eλ δ= −ɺ             ( )33  
   ( )( ) ( )1 1 1g x U xλ ρ λ′ ′= − −ɺ        ( )34           ( ) ( )2 2 1 Eλ ρ δ λ λφ′= + +ɺ         ( )35  
and the corresponding Jacobian becomes  
              
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
2
1
1
1
0 0
1
0 0
0 0
0
g x E
U u
g x U xJ
U x g x
g x
E U x
E
g x
φ
δ
ρ
ρ
φ
φ ρ δ
ρ
 ′ ′−      − − ′′     ′′ ′=  ′′ ′− − −  ′−     ′′ ′  ′ +  ′  − 
 
Again we may apply formula ( )16 to compute the four eigenvalues of the above 
Jacobian, which are crucial to characterize the local dynamics of the linear ODE that 
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approximates the canonical equations ( )32 - ( )35 . But now formula’s ( )16  coefficient 
Ψ  reduces to  
               ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
1
2
E U x
g x g x
U u g x
φ
ρ δ ρ δ
ρ
′′ ′
′ ′Ψ = − − + +
′′ ′−
        ( )36  
and the determinant  of the Jacobian evaluated at the equilibrium is given by 
        ( )( ) ( )
2 2
1 1 1
2 2 2
det
g U U g U
J g g
U g U U
φ φ φ
δ ρ ρ δ
ρ
′′ ′ ′ ′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′
′ ′=− − + + + +
′′ ′ ′′ ′′−
  ( )37  
We consider the strictly concave optimal control problem ( )26  - ( )28  and assume that 
an optimal, interior solution *u  and a stationary equilibrium exist. The stability 
properties of this optimally controlled system depends on the sign of the growth’s 
function rate of change g ′  (evaluated at the steady state) and on the other model 
characteristics in the following way. 
Case 1: 0g ′ ≤  and the long–run equilibrium is a saddle point. The result follows 
directly from ( )37 , since 0g ′ ≤  implies det 0J >  and 0Ψ< . Therefore, two 
eigenvalues must have negative real parts. 
Case 2:  ( )0 g x ρ′< < , the long–run equilibrium is characterized by all different 
cases, i.e. saddle point stability, locally unstable spirals and instability such that 
convergence to the equilibrium is restricted to a one dimensional set of initial 
conditions. According to Poincare–Andronov–Hopf (PAH) theorem, the transition 
from a domain of stable to locally unstable may give rise to limit cycles. 
Under the supposition of growth, 0g ′ >  (Case 2), and a diffusion process 
with one and only one point xɶ  such that ( ) 0g x′ =ɶ , it is well known that the time 
path of the renewable resource level consists of a convex segment ( )if    x x< ɶ  and a 
concave segment (if x x> ɶ). In other words, the domain of the low level ( ) x x< ɶ  
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exhibits increasing returns and the domain of high level is characterized by 
diminishing returns. It is plausible that diminishing returns lead to stable equilibrium, 
whereas increasing returns favour complexities, i.e. limit cycles. The reason is that a 
low level of resource may increase to a certain threshold so it may be rational for the 
agent to expand his equipment to gain future benefits. 
 
Specifications 
We assume benefits stemming from the existing renewable resource stock to 
be proportional to its current level. Moreover the growth of benefits associated with 
the current accumulated level of equipment’s expansion is, however, not unrestricted 
but rather reaches a maximum level. After all we specify the functional forms as 
follows:                                ( )1 1U x a x= ,                 1    0a >    ( )38  
                                   ( ) 212 1 22U u u uβ β= − ,   1 2    0,   0β β> ≥       ( )39  
                                  ( ) ( )1g x x x= −                                              ( )40  
                                 ( )E Eφ γ= ,                     0γ>                     ( )41  
The last two equations represent the fact that a maximum level of the resource exists 
towards which x  grows in the absence of harvesting, while the decline of the 
resource’s level is proportional to the accumulated level of equipment E . But, in the 
long–run, the decision for modifications has a relative small meaning due to the high 
depreciation that has been made on to the past accumulated equipment. That is, at the 
steady state, the decision, *u , tends to zero and this result is attained only setting the 
depreciation rate very close to zero, 0δ ≈ . With the last supposition and under 
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specifications ( )38 - ( )41  the determinant of the Jacobian ( )37  and coefficient Ψ  
( )36 reduces to                           ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
2
1 1
*
22
2
det
g x U x x
J
U u g x
φ ρβ γ
βρ
′′ ′ ′
= =
′′ ′−
               ( )42  
                          ( ) ( )( )
( )21 1 1
2 2
1
a a
g x g x
γ ρ β γ
ρ
β ρ
−
′ ′Ψ = − =              ( )43  
Having the set of necessary requisites for a pair of purely imaginary 
eigenvalues existence, i.e. 
2 2
det  ( )  0
2 2
J
ρ Ψ Ψ− − =  
, 0Ψ>  and  det  ( )  0J > , we 
continue choosing 1a  as the bifurcation point for the certain parameter values 
1 2 1β β= = , 0.01ρ= , 0.071γ = . It can be shown numerically (Grass et al., 2008), 
for the above values of parameters, the conditions for complex eigenvalues with 
positive real parts are met for ( )1 6.69  ,  7.595a ∈ , and moreover stable limit cycles 
exist, at least in the right–hand vicinity of 1       6.69a = . 
Figure 2 shows the phase portrait in the modification – stock plane that 
corresponds to the above values of  1a  
In figure 2 the four phases I – IV characterize 
the cycle as optimal strategy in the management problem.  That is: 
Phase I:   0x>ɺ  and 0u>ɺ     Phase II:  0x>ɺ  and 0u<ɺ  
Phase III: 0x<ɺ  and 0u<ɺ     Phase IV: 0x<ɺ  and 0u>ɺ  
Starting with a minimum level of renewable resource stock, Phase I is 
characterized by reduction in equipment 0u<  but at a diminishing rate 0u>ɺ . This 
process implies that, in the same Phase I, decision u  becomes positive at some time 
instant and continues to grow for sufficient level of the resource stock. In Phase II 
equipment expands yet when resource stock is still rising to its peak. In Phase III 
since the renewable resource stock peaks its maximum value the agent exploits the 
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large stock, but equipment’s high expansion now affects the resource stock which 
declines, so a decision to reduce equipment is taken. Finally, in Phase IV, decision u  
becomes negative, meaning equipment’s reduction, and the resource stock stops the 
downward fall.  
 
             
Figure 2. Phase portrait of the example of a cyclical strategy in a decision–stock plane. 
 
4. Conflicts with a common harvesting function  
Let us, as before, denote by ( )x t  the instantaneous renewable resource which 
is in common access at time t . Without any harvesting taking place the stock of 
resources grows according to the function ( )g x , obviously depending on the resource 
itself, satisfying the conditions ( ) ( )0 0,   0g g x= >  for all ( )0,x K∈ , ( ) 0g x′ <  for 
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all ( ),x K∈ ∞ , ( ) 0g x′′ ≤ . In the game that follows we assume that two types of 
players are involved. First is the renewable resource extractors (players) acting with 
the traditional mode in the sense of Clark (1990), with the latter implying that they are 
armed with the basic equipment, usually harvests only personally, but there is a crowd 
of this type of players. Second are the commercial heavy equipment users with a lot of 
vessels usually acting as factories. Carrying out harvesting is costly for the second 
type of players, e.g. damages in the available equipment, payroll for workingmen, 
also reducing its financial capital.  
Considering now the depletion of the renewable resource stock (the harvesting 
function), one can think that however, does not only depend on the intensive usage 
( )tν  of the heavy equipped player, but is also influenced by the other players’ overall 
effort ( )u t  which act traditionally. We set as instrument variables the intensity of 
equipment and the personal harvesting effort respectively i.e. for the heavy equipped 
player (player type 2) the intensity of the harvesting equipment’s usage ( )tν , and the 
for traditional fishermen (players of kind 1) its personal effort ( )iu t , both assumed 
non-negatives ( ) ( )0,    0it u tν ≥ ≥ . 
We denote the overall harvesting function by ( ),uφ ν , also depending on both 
overall effort ( ) ( )i
i
u t u t=∑  and on intensity. Combining the growth ( )g x  with the 
harvesting function ( ),uφ ν  the state dynamics can be written as 
                      ( ) ( ),x g x uφ ν= −ɺ ,        ( ) 00 0x x= >                                    (44) 
Along a trajectory the non negativity constraint is imposed, that is  
                                 ( ) 0     0x t t≥ ∀ ≥                                                          (45) 
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A higher intensity of harvesting equipment usage (for player 2) and also the effort of 
the crowd of traditionally acting fishermen (player 1) certainly leads to stronger 
depletion of the renewable resource, so it is enough reasonable to assume that the 
partial derivatives of the harvesting function to be positive with respect to the 
parameters, i.e. 0,   0u νφ φ> > . Moreover the law of diminishing returns is applied 
only for the type 1 player’s effort undertaken, that is 0uuφ <  and for simplicity we 
assume 0ννφ = .  Additionally, we assume that the Inada conditions, which guarantee 
that the optimal strategies are nonnegative, holds true, i.e.  
                      
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0
0
lim , ,        lim , 0
lim , 0,          lim ,
u u
u u
u u
u uν ν
ν ν
φ ν φ ν
φ ν φ ν
→ →∞
→ →∞
=∞ =
= =∞
                             (46) 
The utility functions the two players want to maximize are defined as follows: 
Player 1, the representative traditional fisherman, derives instantaneous utility, on one 
hand from its own harvesting product, but its personal effort ( )u t  gives rise to 
increasing and convex costs ( )a u , and on the other hand from the high stock of 
renewable resource also denoted by the increasing function ( )xϕ . After all the 
present value of player’s 1 utility is described by the following functional                            
   ( ) ( ) ( )11
0
,
t
J e u x a u dt
ρ φ ν ϕ
∞
−  = + − ∫                     (47) 
Player 2, the heavy equipped, enjoys utility ( )xυ from the renewable resource 
stock ( )x t , but also from their equipment’s intensity of use ν , which is described by 
the function ( )β ν . For the utilities ( )xυ  and ( )β ν  we assume that they are 
monotonically increasing functions with decreasing marginal returns, that is 
( ) ( )0,   0xυ β ν′ ′> > and ( ) ( )0,   0xυ β ν′′ ′′< < . We also assume that the individually 
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acting players’ overall effort u  has no impact on player’s 2 utility. So, player’s 2 
utility function is defined, in additively separable form, as: 
                                 ( ) ( )22
0
t
J e x dt
ρ υ β ν
∞
−  = + ∫                                      (48) 
 
4.1. Periodic Solutions 
Let us now explore whether periodic solutions are possible, starting with 
steady state and stability analysis of necessary conditions. As it is clear the problem 
can be treated as a differential game with two controls and one state. Corresponding 
Hamiltonians, optimality conditions and adjoint variables for the problem under 
consideration are respectively: 
                   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1, ,H u x a u g x uφ ν ϕ λ φ ν= + − + −  
                               ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 2 ,H x g x uυ β ν λ φ ν= + + −  
                     ( ) ( ) ( )1 11 , 0u
H
u a u
u
λ φ ν
∂ ′= − − =
∂
                               (49) 
                        ( ) ( )2 2 , 0
H
uνβ ν λ φ ν
ν
∂ ′= − =
∂
                                     (50) 
( ) ( )11 1 1 1 1
H
g x x
x
λ ρ λ λ ρ ϕ
∂  ′ ′= − = − − ∂
ɺ                           (51) 
            ( ) ( )22 2 2 2 2
H
g x x
x
λ ρ λ λ ρ υ
∂  ′ ′= − = − − ∂
ɺ                         (52) 
where subscripts denote  player 1 and player 2 respectively for Hamiltonias iH  and 
adjoints iλ   1,2i= . Steady state solutions for the state, adjoints and controls are 
solutions of the system of equations: 
 ( ) ( ),g x uφ ν= ,  ( ) ( )1 1 0g x xλ ρ ϕ ′ ′− − =  ,   ( ) ( )2 2 0g x xλ ρ υ ′ ′− − =   
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( ) ( ) ( )1 , 0u u a uλ φ ν ′− − = ,   ( ) ( ), 0uνβ ν µφ ν′ − = . 
The Jacobian matrix of the system of optimality conditions is the following 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
1 2
1 1 1
1 1
1 2
2 2
2 2 2
1 2
, ,
      0
0
x x x
u u
x g x
J g x x g x
x
g x x g x
x
φ ν φ ν
λ λ
λ λ
λ λ λ
λ ϕ ρ
λ λ
λ υ ρ
λ λ λ
λ λ
 ∂ ∂ ∂    ∂ ∂    ′ ∂ ∂ ∂ − −    ∂ ∂    ∂ ∂ ∂      ′′ ′′ ′= = − − −    ∂ ∂ ∂    ′′ ′′ ′− − −    ∂ ∂ ∂      ∂ ∂ ∂ 
ɺ ɺ ɺ
ɺ ɺ ɺ
ɺ ɺ ɺ

 
which also gives: ( ) ( )1 2tr       J g xρ ρ ′= + −  and  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1 2 1 2
1
2 1
2
,
det      
,
             
u
J g x g x g x g x x g x
u
g x x g x
φ ν
ρ ρ λ ϕ ρ
λ
φ ν
λ υ ρ
λ
∂
′ ′ ′ ′′ ′′ ′= − − − + − −
∂
∂
′′ ′′ ′− + −
∂
 
According to Wirl (1997) (Proposition 4) the existence of a pair of purely 
imaginary eigenvalues requires that the following conditions are satisfied: 
                ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tr    0,   det    0,   0,   det        tr  J J w J w J> > > =  
where coefficient w  is the result of the sum of the following determinants  
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
1
1
2
1 1
2
2 2
2
1 2 1 2
1 2
,
0
0
,
           
, ,
    
u
g x g x
w
g x
g x x g x
u
g x
g x x g x
u u
g x g x x g x x
φ ν
ρ
λ
ρ
λ ϕ ρ
φ ν
λ
λ υ ρ
φ ν φ ν
ρ ρ λ ϕ λ υ
λ λ
∂
′ ′− −
∂= + +
′−
′′ ′′ ′− − −
∂
′ −
∂+ =
′′ ′′ ′− − −
∂ ∂     ′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= − − + − +     ∂ ∂
 
From now on the crucial condition for cyclical strategies (precisely for Hopf 
bifurcations to occur) is that                           
( )
( )
det  
      0,           
tr  
J
w w
J
> =  
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which after simple algebraic calculations reduces to  
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
1 1 2 2
1 2
2
, ,
g x
u u
g x x g x x
ρ ρ ρ ρ
φ ν φ ν
λ ϕ ρ λ υ ρ
λ λ
 ′+ − = 
∂ ∂   ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= + + +   ∂ ∂
                        ( )53  
4.2. Specifications for the game 
We specify the functions of the game as follows: a diffusion process for the 
renewable resource growth function, that is ( ) ( )1g x rx x= − , a Cobb–Douglas  type 
function for the harvesting ( ),u uγφ ν ν=  and the utility function stemming from 
equipment’s intensive use of player 2 in the form ( ) ( ) ( )1 1A ξβ ν ν ξ−= − − . Note that 
the utility function ( )β ν  with 0A>  and ( )0,1ξ ∈  exhibits constant relative risk 
aversion in the sense of Arrow–Pratt measure of risk aversion. All the other functions 
are left in a linear form, i.e. both utilities stemming from the existing renewable 
resource stock are for player 1 ( )x xϕ ϕ=  and for player 2 ( )x xυ υ= , while the 
player’s 1 effort cost in the linear fashion ( )a u au= , as well. Note that all the 
involved coefficients, i.e. the intrinsic growth rate r  and the slopes ,  ϕ υ  and a  are 
positive real numbers, but ( )0,1γ ∈  and 0A>  and ( )0,1ξ ∈ , as already mentioned. 
With the above specifications the following result holds true. 
Proposition 4.1 
A necessary condition for cyclical strategies in the game between traditionally acting 
and heavy equipped players, as described above, is the heavy equipped players are 
more impatient than the simple traditionally acting. 
Proof:  See in the Appendix  
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The intuition behind proposition 4.1 is straightforward. We start with a rather 
low and increasing intensity of equipment usage on behalf of the heavy equipped 
players. The traditionally acting players operate at a low effort, as well, because the 
increasing effort incurs costs, but they are worrying about the renewable resource 
level, consequently for their jobs, by reason of the player 2 presence. Now suppose 
that the heavy equipped react as a farsighted, he would increase the equipment’s 
intensity only moderately and the dynamical system would approach a stable steady 
state. But, due to their impatience they behave myopically and react by strongly 
increasing the intensity of their machines. At this time the crowd of the traditionally 
acting players, has only two choices: to loose their jobs or to increase their overall 
effort. Suppose that they stay in the harvesting increasing their overall effort, but the 
latter means that the combination of high intensity on behalf of the heavy equipped 
and the higher effort on behalf of the crowd leads to a strong reduction of the 
renewable resource stock.  
But the low level of the resource stock is unprofitable for the heavy equipped 
to work at a high intensity, therefore they have to decrease intensity and the cycle is 
closed. A new cycle starts again, possibly in another place because of the stock’s 
reduction, but with the same results also described. In our opinion the crucial point of 
this intuitive explanation is that player’s 1 strategic variable u  lags behind player’s 2 
strategic variable  ν  and both are lagged behind the state variable, the renewable 
resource’s stock x . 
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4.3 The linear example  
In this subsection we calculate the Nash equilibrium of the harvesting 
differential game. The concept of open loop Nash equilibrium is based on the fact that 
every player’s strategy is the best reply to the opponent’s exogenously given strategy. 
Obviously, equilibrium holds if both strategies are simultaneously best replies. 
Following Dockner et al. (2000), we formulate the current value Hamiltonians 
for both players, as follows      
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1, ,H u x a u g x uφ ν ϕ λ φ ν= + − + −  
                   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 2 ,H x g x uυ β ν λ φ ν= + + −  
The first order conditions, for the maximization problem, are the following system of 
differential equations for both players. First, the maximized Hamiltonians are 
                       ( ) ( ) ( )1 11 , 0u
H
u a u
u
λ φ ν
∂ ′= − − =
∂
                               (54) 
                              ( ) ( )2 2 , 0
H
uνβ ν λ φ ν
ν
∂ ′= − =
∂
                                     (55) 
and second, the costate variables are defined by the equations 
  ( ) ( )11 1 1 1 1
H
g x x
x
λ ρ λ λ ρ ϕ
∂  ′ ′= − = − + ∂
ɺ                           (56) 
              ( ) ( )22 2 2 2 2
H
g x x
x
λ ρ λ λ ρ υ
∂  ′ ′= − = − + ∂
ɺ                         (57) 
The Hamiltonian of player 1, 1H , is concave in the control u  as far as 1 1λ <  and is 
guaranteed by the assumptions on the signs of the derivatives, i.e. 0,   0uu ννφ φ< =  
and from the decreasing marginal returns on the player’s 2 utilities, i.e. 
( ) ( )0,   0xυ β ν′′ ′′< < . Moreover, optimality condition (54) implies that the adjoint 
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variable 1λ  is positive only if player’s 1 marginal utility uφ  exceeds marginal costs, 
since     ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 , ,u uu a u uλ φ ν φ ν′= −  . 
We also assume linearity of the model. A linear population growth function, 
despite the critique as a fairly unrealistic model, is a good approximation for the 
exponential growth of human population since 1900 (Murray, 2002). To be more 
precise we specify the following functions of the game in linear form: 
i. the renewable resource’s growth function in the form ( )g x xω= ⋅ , where ω  
is the growth rate,  
ii. the utility function, ( )xϕ , which stems from the high stock of the renewable 
resource, in the form ( )x xϕ ϕ= ⋅  
iii. the function that measures player’s 1 effort cost in the form ( )u t a u= ⋅  
and all the constants involved are positive numbers, that is ,  ,     0aω ϕ > . From the 
second player’s side, the functions that are maximized are specified linear, i.e. the 
utilities arisen from the resource stock and high intensity realizations are written as 
( ) ( )x x tυ υ= ⋅  and ( ) ( )tβ ν β ν= ⋅  respectively. 
After the above simplified specifications the canonical system of equations 
(54) - (55) can be rewritten as:  
                              ( ) ( )1 11 , 0u
H
u a
u
λ φ ν
∂
= − − =
∂
                                        (58) 
                             ( )2 2 , 0
H
uνβ λ φ ν
ν
∂
= − =
∂
                                               (59) 
                            [ ]11 1 1 1 1
H
x
λ ρ λ λ ρ ω ϕ
∂
= − = − −
∂
ɺ                                        (60) 
                            [ ]22 2 2 2 2
H
x
λ ρ λ λ ρ ω υ
∂
= − = − −
∂
ɺ                                      (61) 
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and the limiting transversality conditions has to hold 
          ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 21 2lim 0,     lim 0t t
t t
e x t t e x t t
ρ ρλ λ− −
→∞ →∞
= =                           (62) 
The analytical expressions of the adjoint variables ( )1 2,  λ λ , solving equations  (62)-
(61), are respectively:          ( ) ( )11 1
1
t
t e C
ρ ωϕ
λ
ρ ω
−= +
−
                                          (63)         
                         ( ) ( )22 2
2
t
t e C
ρ ωυ
λ
ρ ω
−= +
−
                                       (64) 
In order for the transversality conditions to be satisfied it is convenient to 
choose the constant steady state values, and therefore the adjoint variables collapses 
to the following constants 
              1 2
1 2
,     
ϕ υ
λ λ
ρ ω ρ ω
= =
− −
                                    (65) 
To ensure certain signs for the adjoints (65) we impose another condition on the 
discount rates, which claim that discount rates are greater than the resource’s growth, 
i.e. we impose the condition ,      1, 2i iρ ω> =   thus, the constant adjoint variables 
have both positive signs.  
The above condition seems to be restrictive but can be justified as otherwise 
optimal solutions do not exist. Indeed, choosing 2ρ ω< , player’s 2 discount rate to be 
lower than the resource’s growth rate, their objective functional becomes unbounded 
in the case they choose to carry out no harvesting. Similarly, choosing player’s 1 
discount rate to be lower than the growth rate the associated adjoint variable 1λ  
becomes a positive quantity in the long run. As a shadow price is implausible to be 
positive for optimal solutions, the above reasoning is sufficient for the assumption  
,    1, 2i iρ ω> = .  
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Once the concavity of the Hamiltonians, with respect to the strategies and for 
both players, is satisfied the first order conditions guarantee its maximization. Now, 
we choose the harvesting function’s ( ),uφ ν  specification, i.e. the specification of the 
function that reduces the renewable resource. This function is depending on both 
effort and intensity. We choose a similar to Cobb – Douglas production function 
specification, which characterized by constant elasticities, in the following form: 
                                    ( ),u uσ ζφ ν ν=       0 1σ ζ< < <  
Let us next present the calculations of the explicit formulas at the Nash equilibrium. 
 
4.4. Optimal Nash Strategies 
Applying first order conditions for the chosen specification function  
                        ( ) 1
1 1
,           
1 1
u
a a
u uσ ζφ ν σ ν
λ λ
−= ⇔ =
− −
                                (66) 
                          ( ) 1
2 2
,                u uσ ζν
β β
φ ν ζ ν
λ λ
−= ⇔ =                                   (67) 
The combination of (66) and (67), using the Cobb–Douglas type of specification,  
reveals an existing interrelationship between the strategies, that is 
   ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* *
* * * * * * 2
1 2 1
,                    
1 1
aau
u u u
σ ζ ζλβν
φ ν ν ν
σ λ ζλ σ λ β
= ⇔ = ⇔ =
− −
    (68) 
Expression (68) now predicts the interrelationship between the player’s Nash 
strategies, for which the result of comparison between them is dependent on the 
constant parameters and on the constant adjoint variables, as well. 
Substituting back (68) into (67) we are able to find the analytical expressions 
of the strategies, after the following algebraic calculations. Expression (67) now 
becomes: 
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              ( )
( ) ( )
1 11 1
1
* 2 2 2
1 11 1
a a
u
ζ ζζ ζ
σ ζ ζλ λ ζ λ ζ
σ λ β β σ λ β
− −− − −
+ −                = =             − −           
 
and from the latter the analytical expressions for the equilibrium strategies is derived 
in a more comparable form now, as: 
                               
( )
1
1 1
* 2
11
a
u
ζ ζ
σ ζ σ ζζλ
σ λ β
− −
+ − + −    =    −    
                      (69) 
                               
( )
1
1 1
* 2
11
a
σ σ
σ ζ σ ζζλ
ν
σ λ β
−
+ − + −    =    −    
                        (70) 
Further substitutions in the equation of the resource’s accumulation, x x uσ ζω ν= −ɺ , 
yield the following steady state value of the stock  
                               
( )
1 1
2
1
1
1
SS
a
x
σ ζ
σ ζ σ ζζλ
ω λ σ β
−
+ − + −    =    −    
                     (71) 
We summarize the above discussion in a proposition. 
 
Proposition 4.2:  
Assuming the harvesting function to exhibit constant elasticity and all the other 
functions to be linear, then the harvesting game yields constant optimal Nash 
strategies. The analytical expressions of the strategies are given by (69) and (70) for 
the traditional fishermen and the heavy equipped respectively. The steady state value 
of the resources’ stock is given by the expression (71). 
 
Proposition 4.2 seems to be with a little economic meaning caused by the 
linearity of the paradigm. But the constancy of the resulting strategies can be seen in 
connection with the concept of time consistency, a central property in economic 
theory. By the large, time consistency is a minimal requirement for a strategy’s 
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credibility, but in general open loop strategies they have not the time consistency 
property by default, since these strategies are time, and not state, dependent functions. 
Nevertheless, a constant strategy may be a time consistent one, since the crucial 
characteristic for time consistency, i.e. the independency of any initial state 0x , is met 
for the above constant strategies.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Overfishing is caused due to the imposition of externalities on national and 
international levels. The Tragedy of the Commons occurring in the fishing industry is 
related to the inefficient allocation of resources in harvesting and the resulting 
reduction of the available limited resource stocks due to the common access 
competition. This common access competition requires regulation of fishing efforts 
and fishing capacity to attain sustainability. This regulation may be limited due to the 
absence of appropriate international authorities as well as due to the occurring 
Prisoners’ dilemma situations as governments tend to support their fisheries.  
In Environmental Economics the exploitation of renewable resources is a well 
overlooked field since the original model dated back to Schӓfer (1994). As known, the 
analysis concentrates on the two basic factors that affect the fishing industry, namely 
the size of the resource itself and the rate of human harvesting. The above 
specification does not take into account any other human activities which affect 
biomass, for example coastlines pollution.  
Concerning long–run equilibrium, as it is well known, the simplest case of the 
saddle–point type stability requires only one characteristic of the renewable resource’s 
growth function that is the negative growth. But even the supposition of negative 
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growth is sufficient for the saddle-point stability, the local monotonicity is not implied 
i.e. transient cycles may occur. 
On the other hand, harvesting management is not restricted in the traditional 
way of the renewable resource extraction in the sense of one man show. Commercial 
harvesting often requires investment and disinvestment in equipment, and the 
undertaken decision to expand or to reduce equipment obeys onto the state variable 
which is the existing renewable resource stock. Therefore, concerning harvesting, as a 
stock variable, equilibrium dynamics become more complex, and much richer, also 
including saddle–point stability. The dynamics of such equilibrium reveal cyclical 
policies as optimal strategies. 
The emphasis given in our paper is not restricted on the stability properties of 
the optimal management program, but we also focus on the stability properties of the 
induced nonzero sum game between two types of players which share a common 
depletion function thought as a harvesting. Precisely, the game set up between a 
crowd of weakly armed and a strongly armed player with a common depletion 
function yields an economic result, for which the discount rate plays the crucial role 
for periodic solutions. That is, the condition for periodic solutions is that the strong 
equipped player to be more impatient than the weak. Finally, for the supplement 
linear example of the same game we compute the optimal Nash strategies for both 
players, which are constant expressions. 
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Appendix  
Proof of proposition 4.1. 
With the specifications, given in subsection 4.2, one can compute  
( ) ( )1 2g x r x′ = − , ( ) 2g x r′′ =− , ( ) 1,u u uγφ ν γ −= , ( ),u uγνφ ν = , ( )a u a′ = , 
( ) 2ξβ ν ν −′ = , ( )xϕ ϕ′ = , ( )xυ υ′ =  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1 10      1 ,       1u
H
u a u u a
u
γλ φ ν λ γ ν−
∂ ′= ⇔ − = ⇔ − =
∂
      ( ).1Α  
( ) ( ) 22 2 20      ,       
H
u uγ ξνβ ν λ φ ν λ ν
ν
−∂ ′= ⇔ = ⇔ =
∂
                         ( ).2Α  
Combining ( ).1Α  and ( ).2Α  the optimal strategies take the following forms 
                      
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )2 1 1 1
1 1 1 1*
2
11
a
u
ξ ξ γ
γ ξ
λ
γ λ
 − + − − 
 − + − − 
 
 =  −     
( ).3Α ,     
                    
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )( )1 1 1
1 1 1 1*
2
11
a
γ γ ξ
γ γ ξ
ν λ
γ λ
 + − − 
 − + − − 
 
 =  −  
     ( ).4Α  
and the optimal harvesting becomes 
            ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1* *
2
1
,
1
a
u
γ ξ γ ξ
γ ξ
φ ν λ
γ λ
 − + − − 
 − + − − 
 
 =  −  
                ( ).5Α  
with the following partial derivatives 
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( )( )
( )
( )
( )
( )( )
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2
1
1 1
* *
1
1 1
1 1 1 1
, 1
       
1 1 1 1
a
u
γ ξ γ ξ
γ ξ
λ
γ λ γ ξφ
λ λ ξ γ
φ ν γ ξ
λ ξ γ
 − + − − 
 − + − − 
 
 
 − −∂  = =
∂ − + − −
−
=
− + − −
     ( ).6Α  
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( )
( )( )
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2
1
2 2
* *
2
1 1
1 1 1
, 1
       
1 1 1
a
u
γ ξ γ ξ
γ ξ
λ
γ λφ
λ λ ξ γ
φ ν
λ ξ γ
 − + − − 
 − + − − 
 
 
 −∂ − = =
∂ + − −
−
=
+ − −
    ( ).7Α  
 38 
Both derivatives ( ).6Α , ( ).7Α  are negatives due to the assumptions on the parameters 
( ),    0,1γ ξ ∈  and on the signs of derivates, that is ( ) ( )0,  0,  0,  0u x xνφ φ υ ϕ′ ′> > > > , 
which ensures the positive sign of the adjoints 1 2,  λ λ . 
Condition 
( )
( )
det  
     
tr  
J
w
J
=  now becomes  
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
1 2
2g x g x g x
φ φ
ρ ρ ρ ρ λ ρ λ ρ
λ λ
∂ ∂ ′ ′′ ′′+ − = +  ∂ ∂
, which after substituting the 
values from ( ).6Α ,  ( ).7Α  and making the rest of algebraic manipulations, finally 
yields (at the steady states) 
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )
( )1 2 1 2 1 2
1
,
1 2 0
1 1 1
u g x
g x
g x
φ ν ϕ
ρ γ ξ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
ξ γ ϕ ρ
∞ ∞
 ′′    ′− − − + − =  ′+ − − + −  
     ( ).8Α    
Where we have set 
( )
1
1 11 g x
λ ϕ
λ ρ ϕ
=
′− − −
 stemming from the adjoint equation 
( )( ) ( )1 1 1 g x xλ λ ρ ϕ′ ′= − −ɺ , which at the steady states reduces into 
( ) ( )( )1 1x g xλ ϕ ρ′ ′= − . 
Condition 0w>  after substitution the values from ( ).6Α ,  ( ).7Α  becomes 
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )
2
1 2
1
,
1 1 0
1 1 1
u g x
w g x
g x
φ ν ϕ
ρ ρ γ ξ
ξ γ ϕ ρ
 ′′ −  ′= − + − + >   ′+ − − + −  
     ( ).9Α  
The division ( ).8Α  by 1ρ  yields 
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )
( )2 2 1 2
1 1
,
1 2 0
1 1 1
u g x
g x
g x
φ ν ρϕ
γ ξ ρ ρ ρ
ξ γ ϕ ρ ρ
∞ ∞
 ′′    ′− − − + − =  ′+ − − + −  
( ).10Α  
The sum ( ).9Α +( ).10Α  must be positive, thus after simplifications and taking into 
account that ( ) ( ),u g xφ ν∞ ∞ = , we have: 
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
2
1 2
2
1 1 1 1
g x g x g x
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ ξ γ
−  ′′ ′> −  + − − 
 and the result 2 1ρ ρ>  follows from 
the strict concavity of the logistic growth 0g ′′ < . 
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